



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

THE DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE LEADING UP TO THE WAR

PART I. FROM THE AUSTRIAN NOTE TO THE DECLARATION OF WAR BY AUSTRIA ON SERVIA, JULY 23-28, 1914

The recent appearance of the Austrian Red Book and Servian Blue Book ^a completes the history of the breaking out of the war, as told in the official diplomatic correspondence of the belligerent nations, so far as they have seen fit to make this correspondence public.

It is the purpose of this article to attempt to summarize the story told by this correspondence, and at the same time to indicate the conclusions which in the opinion of the writer may properly be drawn therefrom, with respect to the immediate causes of the war. The dispatches are so numerous, and the action they record was crowded into such a short space of time that it is difficult to keep this summary within reasonable limits. And this difficulty is increased by the fact that those who sympathize with the viewpoint of the belligerents on the one side or the other, are apt to differ radically as to which parts of the correspondence are important, therefore making it necessary for anyone desirous of summarizing the documents in a way to afford a basis for a fair consideration of the arguments advanced on either side, to go into the correspondence much more fully than would be necessary if there were a greater agreement as to the relative importance of the issues which it presents. It will be the effort of the writer, while confining himself—with such exceptions as are specifically noted—strictly to the diplomatic correspondence, to set out impartially the portions of the correspondence especially emphasized, on the one side and on the other, with full references to the original documents. If he is successful in this, his readers can be relied on to correct any errors in his comments and conclusions.

THE EVIDENTIAL VALUE OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE

In the discussions of the causes of the war, which have heretofore appeared, there has not only been manifest a great difference of opinion

^a The latter has become available since this article was put in type. It does not materially affect the situation, but several references thereto have been added.

as to what the diplomatic correspondence shows, but also disagreement as to the value of any conclusions which can possibly be reached by the examination of the official correspondence. On the one hand there has been perhaps in some instances a disposition to give too great weight to the mere fact that a statement (perhaps a hearsay statement) appears somewhere in the correspondence; and upon the other, a disposition to discredit all such official documents, as being written for effect and having no real value in forming a just appreciation of the great events with which they deal. It is respectfully submitted that both these extreme views are mistaken.

It is of course true that diplomatic communications frequently contain sentiments which justify Hosea Biglow's comment,

Ain't our piety sech (in our speeches an' messiges)
Ez t' astonish ourselves in the bes'-composed pessiges.

They even sometimes contain statements of alleged fact which cannot be excused merely as mistakes, but deserve to be qualified "by a shorter and uglier word." But when the correspondence on both sides is considered, particularly when it consists of simultaneous telegraphic exchanges between a half a dozen capitals, as in the present case, such misstatements, if they exist, can ordinarily be detected. And even a misstatement has its value. It either shows what the man who made it thought to be the fact at the time, or what he wished others to think was the fact. And either of these may be as important as the fact itself, in elucidating the issues to which the correspondence relates.

It is also true that the diplomatic correspondence preceding a war very frequently—and this was naturally the case in the hurried telegraphic exchanges of the week preceding the outbreak of the present war—deals with the immediate rather than the fundamental causes of the war. We should not expect a verbatim record of the conference of the Roman envoys with the Carthaginian Senate while Hannibal was hammering the walls of Saguntum (if obtainable) to afford an adequate discussion of the underlying philosophy of the death struggle between Rome and Carthage. For this we must wait for Livy, if not for Bernhardt and Cramb. But such a record would be of immense interest and value. Fundamental causes must wait an occasion to make themselves

manifest, and sometimes the occasion never comes. Even the immediate causes of the greatest war in history are worthy of the most careful study.

Again, it may be admitted that no country in such circumstances as the present, could be expected to publish at this time all of its official correspondence relevant to the outbreak of the war, and that none of the belligerent countries have in fact done so.¹

But while this affects the value of the diplomatic correspondence as published, it does so to a very different degree depending on the apparent nature, extent and justification for the omissions. For instance, in the present case it is of course absolutely natural and proper (so long as the elimination of this portion of the diplomatic correspondence does not distort the meaning of the remainder) for all the belligerent governments to observe great discretion with respect to what they publish which may relate to or involve the Italian government; and needless to say they have all done so. On the other hand, the omission of correspondence exchanged before the opening of hostilities, between allies now parties to the war, as for instance the omission of correspondence known to have taken place between Germany and Austria, which is noticeable in both the German White Paper and Austrian Red Book, although explainable on perfectly legitimate grounds, is more significant.

Again, while the "falsification" of such correspondence (unless we so classify such incidents as Bismarck's editing of the Ems telegram) is

¹ Mr. James M. Beck, in his article "In the Supreme Court of Civilization," *N. Y. Times Current History of the War*, No. 3, Jan. 9, 1915, pp. 415, 416, pointed out the omission from the German White Paper of practically all correspondence between Berlin and Vienna, an omission which the publication of the Austrian Red Book since that time has only made good to a limited extent. But Mr. Beck appears to have fallen into error when he made the sweeping statement that "the official defense of England and Russia does not apparently show any failure on the part of either to submit all of the documents in their possession."

Compare Dr. von Mach's "Defense of the Dual Alliance, a Reply," *ibid.*, p. 438, pointing out omissions in the British White Paper (which however, aside from the correspondence with Rome, as to which see *supra*, p. 404, do not appear to be important); and Dr. Helfferich's "The Dual Alliance v. The Triple Entente," *N. Y. Times*, March 14, 1915, which performs the same service, for the French Yellow Book. An omission from the Russian Orange Book is pointed out *infra*, p. 421, note 43.

happily practically unknown, it is of course always possible and has been charged in the present instance (most injudiciously, it is respectfully submitted) by a distinguished professor.² Against such a charge correspondence published while it is still hot, so to speak, as the British White Paper, albeit it not unnaturally shows some signs of its hasty compilation, is in a better position than the more finished French Yellow Book, published only after a considerable interval for reflection, and containing correspondence of earlier years, which cannot in the nature of things be supported by the internal evidence of cross-references which so greatly fortifies the numerous telegraphic exchanges during the week prior to the outbreak of the war.

Moreover, it is quite true, as has been pointed out, that even if the diplomatic correspondence were published in toto, with literal accuracy, we would still have much to learn elsewhere even concerning the immediate causes of the outbreak of the war. There would still be those "important plans * * * laid in the embrasures of windows where important men stand and talk so that no one can hear."³ And under modern conditions there must be added (unless they were officially recorded) the telephonic conversations, such, for instance, as those which are known to have taken place between Berlin and Vienna, and which may have changed the fate of history.

But after all reservations and deductions are made, it remains true that if the immediate responsibility for the war were a matter for inquiry before the Hague Court, or any other arbitral tribunal,—as other similar although less important matters have been,—the court would resort in the first place to the diplomatic correspondence, for the all sufficient reason that experience has shown that in general this obvious official source of information is, with all its limitations and imperfections, more to be relied upon than any other.

² By Professor Delbrück, of the University of Berlin, in an article entitled "Germany's Answer," *Atlantic Monthly*, February, p. 241. The word "falsification" may possibly be due to an unhappy translation. But there can be no question of Professor Delbrück's responsibility (upon the strength of a preconceived theory supported it is submitted by wholly insufficient evidence) for the substantial charge conveyed by the word, against the English and apparently also the French Government.

³ Professor Sloan, in *N. Y. Times Current History of the War*, Vol. I, No. 3, p. 520.

THE ASSASSINATIONS OF SERAJEVO, AND THE AUSTRIAN NOTE OF
JULY 23RD

On June 28, 1914, Archduke Francis Ferdinand d'Este, presumptive heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, and his Consort, the Princess of Hohenberg, were assassinated at Serajevo, in Bosnia, by Slavs of Servian sympathies but Austrian nationality.^{3a}

It was at once charged in the Austrian press that the crime was the result of Pan-Slav agitation, originating in Servia, and a bitter discussion ensued between the newspapers of the two countries.^{3a} It was generally recognized in the chancellories of Europe that the crime would and should result in representations on the part of Austria to Servia, after proper investigation; but a considerable nervousness was felt as to whether or not Austria's representations would be kept within reasonable bounds. The Austrian Government appears to have kept its own counsel officially, with the exception of Germany.⁴ But the matter was in the air everywhere in diplomatic circles, and Sir M. de Bunsen the British Ambassador at Vienna, on July 15th received from a private source a forecast of what was about to happen, which he telegraphed to his government on the following day.⁵ Apparently upon the strength

^{3a} See Servian Blue Book, Nos. 8, 12, 16.

⁴ As to the nature of Germany's advance information see *infra*, p. 418, note 35.

Italy, the other member of the Triple Alliance, appears not to have been taken into the confidence of Austria. On July 27th M. Barrere, French Ambassador at Rome, reported to his government the following conversation with the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs:

"He spoke to me of the contents of the Austrian note, and formally assured me that he had not had any previous knowledge of it.

"He knew, indeed, that this note was to have a rigorous and forcible character; but he had not suspected that it could take such a form. I asked him if it was true that he had given at Vienna, as certain papers allege, an approval of the Austrian action and an assurance that Italy would fulfil her duties as an ally towards Austria. 'In no way,' the Minister replied: 'we were not consulted; we were told nothing; it was not for us, then, to make any such communication to Vienna.'"

(French Yellow Book, No. 72, SUPPLEMENT to this JOURNAL, April, 1915, p. 208). See to the same effect, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, September 1, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, Jan. 1915, p. 2, who says that the Italian Ambassador at Vienna "was left completely in the dark." See also French Yellow Book, Nos. 26, 35, 50, 56, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, pp. 172, 181, 191, 196; British White Paper, No. 38, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, pp. 282, 283.

⁵ Sir M. de Bunsen's dispatch to Sir Edward Grey, Sept. 1, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, Jan. 1915, p. 1, refers to this telegram which however does not appear in the British

of this telegram Sir Edward Grey mentioned the matter to the German Ambassador on July 20th, expressing the hope that Austria would not do anything until "they had first disclosed to the public their case against Servia."⁶ Sir Edward Grey also appears to have taken the matter up with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, direct, and "asked him to recommend his government not to depart from the prudence and moderation necessary for avoiding new complications; not to demand from Servia any measures to which she could not reasonably submit, and not to allow themselves to be carried away too far."⁷

Russia and France also approached the Governments of Austria and Germany with suggestions of moderation, and warnings of the probable consequences of unreasonable action.⁸ The advice of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Sazonof, to the Austro-Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires, was especially significant. "No country has suffered more than Russia, from crimes prepared upon foreign territory. Have we ever claimed to adopt against any country whatever the measures with which your newspapers threaten Servia? Do not enter upon that path."⁹

In response to these representations, the Russian and French Ambassadors had received reassuring declarations at Vienna as to the contents of the forthcoming Austrian note, in the case of the French Am-

White Paper. See Dr. von Mach's article *N. Y. Times Current History of the War*, Vol. I, No. 3, p. 438, referred to *supra*, p. 404, note 1.

⁶ British White Paper, No. 1, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 1. The German Ambassador in turn either upon this or some other occasion about the same time, appears to have asked Sir Edward Grey privately, if need arose, to "exercise moderating influence at St. Petersburg." (British White Paper, No. 11, Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, British Ambassador at Paris, July 24, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 266.)

⁷ French Yellow Book, No. 19, M. Paul Cambon to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 22, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 165.

⁸ French Yellow Book, No. 15, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 21, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, April, p. 162 (recounting representations at Berlin by the Servian, Russian and French representatives). See also French Yellow Book, No. 17, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 164.

⁹ French Yellow Book, No. 10, M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. Viviani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 6, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 159.

bassador as late as July 22nd and 23rd.¹⁰ On the same day that the last of these interviews was had—namely, July 23rd—the Austrian note was presented. The viewpoint of this note can be better understood after reading the report of Freiherr von Giesl, Austrian Minister at Belgrade, to the Austrian Foreign Office, dated July 21, 1914, in which, after he has discussed Austro-Servian relations and the attitude of public opinion in Servia with respect to the Pan-Servian movement, and the assassinations at Serajevo, he says by way of summary:

I consider this exposition essential to the inevitable conclusion that a settlement with Servia, involving a war not only for the preservation of Austria-Hungary's position as a great power, but even for her very existence, cannot be permanently avoided. * * *

Should we decide to make far-reaching demands, with effective control of their execution (and such measures alone could clean the Augean Stable of Greater Servian intrigues), we would have to consider all possible consequences. From the very outset we must be firmly resolved to persevere in our attitude.¹¹

The Austrian note, delivered two days later, July 23rd, at six o'clock, p. m. was conceived in the spirit of this advice. It starts out with a general arraignment of the Pan-Servian movement against the integrity of Austria-Hungary, which it is said Servia has permitted in open violation of her formal promise in 1909 to withdraw opposition to the annexation of Bosnia and "live on good neighborly terms" with Austria. This count of the indictment is summed up with the charge that "Servia has permitted all manifestations of a nature to incite the Servian population to hatred of the Monarchy and contempt of its institutions."

The note next proceeds to a specific charge of Servian responsibility for the assassinations of Serajevo. The count on this head reads:

It is evident from the depositions and confessions of the criminal perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th of June that the Serajevo assassination had been planned in Belgrade, that the arms and explosives with

¹⁰ French Yellow Book, Nos. 18 and 20; British Command Paper 7596, Miscellaneous No. 10, 1914, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, Sept. 1, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, Jan. 1915, p. 1. As a consequence the Russian Ambassador at Vienna felt justified in going on leave July 20th. (French Yellow Book, No. 18, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 164).

¹¹ Austrian Red Book, No. 6, Freiherr von Giesl to Count Berchtold, July 21, 1914. This book will be printed in a future issue of the SUPPLEMENT to this JOURNAL.

which the murderers were provided had been given to them by Servian officers and functionaries belonging to the Narodna Odbrana, and, finally, that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organized and carried out by the Chiefs of the Servian frontier service.¹²

The note then proceeds to demand a publication in the official journal of the Servian Government of a declaration, the terms of which are prescribed, formally condemning the Pan-Servian movement, this declaration also to be communicated to the Servian army, as an order of the day, and published in the official army bulletin. Furthermore, ten specific and very drastic demands are made upon the Servian Government for action, looking towards the suppression of Pan-Servian and Anti-Austrian propaganda in all its manifestations; *i. e.*, in the press, through the Servian society Narodna Odbrana, already mentioned, and similar societies engaging in an anti-Austrian propaganda, in the schools, in the army and in official life.

The most serious of these demands, however, and the ones which under very general and even indefinite language doubtless aimed at securing that "effective control" of Servia of which Freiherr von Giesl spoke, and which therefore threatened the independence and sovereignty of Servia, were numbers 5 and 6, which read as follows:

5. To accept the coöperation in Servia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy;

6. To take judicial proceedings against accomplices in the plot of the 28th of June who are on Servian territory. Delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto.¹³

The note concludes with the statement that "the Austro-Hungarian Government awaits the reply of the Royal Government at the latest by six o'clock on Saturday evening, the 25th of July."

The note was accompanied by a half-page memorandum stating the conclusions reached up to that time as a result of the investigation of the

¹² Note addressed to the Servian Government by the Austro-Hungarian Government on July 23, 1914. Austrian Red Book, No. 7; British White Paper, No. 4, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, pp. 254-257.

¹³ Note addressed to the Servian Government by the Austro-Hungarian Government on July 23, 1914. Austrian Red Book, No. 7; British White Paper, No. 4, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, pp. 254-257.

assassination of the Archduke, by the judicial authorities at Serajevo. The circular note of Count Berchtold to the Austrian Ambassadors to the Powers, transmitting the note to Servia stated that the Austrian Government had a "dossier recording Servian machinations and showing the connection between these machinations and the murder of the 28th of June" which it "holds at the disposal" of the various Powers.¹⁴ This dossier was actually transmitted in a circular dispatch of Count Berchtold of July 25th.¹⁵ It was communicated to the French government on July 27th¹⁶ and presumably at about the same time to the other Powers. Much of the material contained in the dossier is of slight importance in itself except by way of creating an atmosphere through its cumulative effect.¹⁷ The summary of the testimony and confessions before the examining judge at Serajevo contains, however, detailed and specific evidence with respect to the complicity of certain Servian officials in the assassination of the Archduke, which if true is very damaging. This evidence undoubtedly called for an immediate and searching investigation on the part of the Servian Government without waiting to be asked,¹⁸

¹⁴ Austrian Red Book, No. 8. British White Paper, No. 4, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 259.

¹⁵ Austrian Red Book, No. 19.

¹⁶ French Yellow Book, No. 75, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 212.

¹⁷ See for instance enclosure 11, relating to "Anti-Austro-Hungarian paintings in the Ministry of War at Belgrade," which are thus described: "Over a landscape, part mountain (Bosnia) and part plain (Southern Hungary) there is shown the 'zora' or dawning of Servian hopes. In the foreground is an armed woman upon whose shield are the names of all the provinces 'yet to be freed'—Bosnia, Herzegovina, Vojvodina, Symria, Dalmatia, etc."

¹⁸ On June 30th the Austrian legation at Belgrade asked the Secretary General of the Servian Foreign Office "the pertinent inquiry as to what steps the Royal police had taken or intended to take in an effort to trace the threads of the outrage which notoriously led into Servia. His reply was that so far the Servian police had not even taken the matter up." (Austrian Red Book, No. 2, Ritter Von Storek to Count Berchtold.) Servia would seem to have made a great mistake, to say the least, in not immediately starting an inquiry on the basis of this suggestion.

One cannot but be impressed with a remark of Count Mensdorff, Austrian Ambassador to London, in discussing the Austrian note with Sir Edward Grey on July 24th, that "the present situation might never have arisen if Servia had held out a hand after the murder of the Archduke." (British White Paper, No. 5, Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.)

[When the above was written the Servian Blue Book was not available. See Nos. 5, 8 and 30. The conclusion reached in the text is not, however, affected.]

with a view not only to the punishment of those guilty of complicity in the assassination of the Archduke, so far as they were to be found on Servian soil, but to the clearing up of conditions which made possible the successful launching of attempts on the lives of Austrian officials from Servian territory, if these conditions were in fact as indicated by the evidence presented. It must be remembered, however, that this evidence—at least as far as the Servian Government is concerned—is wholly *ex parte*, and that the treason trials at Agram in Croatia, in 1909, followed by the celebrated libel suit of the Serbo-Croat leaders against Dr. Friedjung at Vienna (involving the authenticity of documentary evidence supplied by the Austrian Foreign Office, and comparable to the famous state trial growing out of the London *Times* articles on Parnellism and crime) give point to the obvious suggestion that the Servian Government was and is entitled to be heard in its own defense before it is condemned.

With so much of the Austrian note as was aimed at securing the bona fide and energetic coöperation of Serbia in punishing the assassins of the Archduke Ferdinand, without impairing Servian sovereignty and independence, everyone must sympathize.¹⁹ But the demand for Austrian participation even in the proceedings looking toward the detection and punishment of the assassins certainly raises grave and delicate questions of procedure. And it is submitted that it was unreasonable under the circumstances to add to this demand, which still has a legitimate and specific object, namely, the punishment of the assassins, the further general demand that Serbia should attempt to suppress the political aspirations of her people, even though these aspirations involved in a general and indefinite way the desire for the future acquisition of Austrian territory. It would have been little more unreasonable in principle and as matters have turned out, no more dangerous for the Austrian govern-

¹⁹ See remarks of M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Count Szapary, July 24, 1914, as reported by M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, French Yellow Book, No. 54, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 194.

“‘The intention which inspired this document,’ he said, ‘is legitimate if you pursue no other aim but the protection of your territory against the agitation of Servian anarchists. But the step to which you have had recourse is not defensible.’ He concluded, ‘take back your ultimatum, modify its form, and I will guarantee its result.’”

ment to seize upon some just cause of grievance which it might have had against Italy to demand of the Italian Government the suppression of all Irredentist propaganda in Italy; or for the German Government as a part of the Morocco settlement to have demanded that the French Government officially suppress all agitation in the French press, in the schools, or public life generally for the re-acquisition of the lost provinces. When, in addition to this demand, in its substance unreasonable, there was superadded the vague requirement for "collaboration" of Austrian officers "in the suppression of the subversive movement against Austria," which might mean almost anything by way of "effective control," one cannot wonder that the German Secretary of State, in talking with the British Ambassador, admitted that "the Servian government could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands;" and "confessed privately that he thought the note left much to be desired, as a diplomatic document."²⁰ Or that Sir Edward Grey, in speaking to the Austrian Ambassador, observed that he had "never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character."²¹

THE RECEPTION OF THE AUSTRIAN NOTE BY THE POWERS—AUSTRIA REFUSES TO EXTEND THE TIME LIMIT

When the terms of the Austrian note to Serbia became known in the chancelleries of Europe on July 24th, they were received with surprise everywhere outside of Germany; with deep indignation and resentment

²⁰ British White Paper, No. 18, *supra*. According to the German Ambassador to Austria, however, it was "impossible to speak effectively in any other way to Servia." (British White Paper, No. 32, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, July 26, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 279 at 280.) And compare the German official statement on July 24th, that "the course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as equitable and moderate." British White Paper, No. 9, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 263.

²¹ British White Paper, No. 5, Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, July 24, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, pp. 259-260. See also French Yellow Book, No. 34, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 180.

Compare Sir Edward Grey's reference in speaking with the German Ambassador; to the "extraordinarily stiff character of the Austrian note." (British White Paper, No. 11, July 24, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 266.) See also British White Paper, Nos. 7, 16, 24, and 44.

in Russia, and with grave apprehension in England and France. It was instantly recognized,—except apparently at Berlin, and Vienna,—that if a great European catastrophe was to be prevented, something must be done at once. At the same time the speed with which it was necessary to act, owing to the time limit, made it much more difficult to determine what was best to be done. The 24th of July, therefore, was a day of hurried telegraphic consultations between the capitals of Europe. The danger point was of course St. Petersburg.²² M. Sazonof, the Rus-

²² Professor Delbrück, in the magazine article already referred to (*supra*, note 2, p. 405) maintains that "the fundamental error of the British Blue Book in the presentation of the case is the assumption of the right of Russia to assume the protection of Servia," and argues that if Sir Edward Grey had really desired to maintain peace "he would have made it clear to the Czar that he must withdraw his protecting hand from Servia," which Professor Delbrück admits "would have been rather hard for the Czar to concede." But this contention entirely ignores the previous relations of the parties. In Count Berchtold's circular note to the Austrian Ambassadors to the Powers, communicating the text of the note to Servia, of July 23rd, he charges that the Servian Government had failed "in the duty imposed on it by the solemn declaration of the 31st March, 1909, and acted in opposition to *the will of Europe* and the undertaking given to Austria-Hungary" (Austrian Red Book, No. 8, Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors, July 22, 1914; communicated by Count Mensdorff, Austrian Ambassador at London, to Sir Edward Grey, July 24, 1914, British White Paper No. 4, SUPPLEMENT, October, 1914, p. 258. Italics the author's), thereby recognizing that, although the undertaking of 1909 was given in terms to Austria, it was given as the result of consultation and joint action on the part of the great Powers. (See British White Paper, No. 17, Sir George Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, July 25, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, October, 1914, p. 270.)

The memorandum introductory to the Austrian Red Book refers to Russia as "assuming the part" of protector to Servia in 1909; and that Russia's attitude was unchanged and was well known to the Austrian and German Governments. "During the Balkan crisis" the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs "had made it clear to the Austrian Government that war with Russia must inevitably follow an Austrian attack on Servia." (British White Paper No. 139, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, quoting the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Aug. 1st, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 361. See to the same effect British White Paper No. 78, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, July 29, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, Oct., p. 313 at 314.) And at that time the Austrian government recognized Russia's right to befriend Servia by agreeing to a compromise with respect to the Albanian frontier line. (British White Paper, No. 118, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, July 31, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, Oct., p. 346.) Both Austria and Germany in the course of the published correspondence make formal record of their understanding of Russia's conception of her interest in the premises. In Count Berchtold's elaborate dispatch to the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, of July 25th, in which he gave the Ambassador general instructions with respect to his attitude during the pending crisis, he said "In resolving

sian Minister for Foreign Affairs, immediately upon the receipt of the text of the Austrian note arranged by telephone for a conference with the British and French Ambassadors, at the French Embassy. M. Sazonof qualified Austria's conduct as "provocative and immoral," and said "she would never have taken such action unless Germany had first been consulted." He and the French Ambassador urged upon the British Ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, that the only hope of peace lay in Great Britain joining France and Russia in a firm attitude, arguing that Great Britain "would sooner or later be dragged into the war, if it did break out;" and would only have rendered war far more likely if she did not "from the outset make common cause with his country and with France."²³

to proceed firmly against Serbia we are fully aware that a conflict with Russia may result from the existing Servian differences." (Austrian Red Book, No. 26, Count Berchtold to Count Szapary, at St. Petersburg, July 25, 1914.) In the German official memorandum upon the negotiations it is said "we were fully aware in this connection that warlike moves on the part of Austria-Hungary against Serbia would bring Russia into the question and might bring us into the war in accordance with our duties as an ally." (German memorandum, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 373.)

Finally, Austria recognized Russia's interest in the matter by her repeated assurances to Russia and to other Powers that she intended to respect Serbia's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Why these assurances if it was no concern of Russia's what happened to Serbia? If the Powers in general, or Russia in particular, had any right to these assurances, they were likewise entitled to consider whether the Austrian demands did not in fact render them nugatory. It is too late to deny that the "Eastern question" is a matter of general European concern. Indeed, it would seem that Professor Delbrück's contention that Russia was not entitled to a voice with respect to Austria's proposed chastisement of Serbia really amounts to an admission of the truth of the Russian contention that Austria aimed at overthrowing the "status quo in the Balkans and establishing her own hegemony there." (British White Paper, No. 17, July 25, 1914, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey; SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 270 at 271.)

²³ British White Paper, No. 6, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, pp. 261, 262.

The Russian and French Governments repeatedly urged this view upon Great Britain during the course of the negotiations. Thus, on July 25th, Sir George Buchanan reports M. Sazonof as saying that "he did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia, there would be no war. If we failed them now, rivers of blood would flow and we would in the end be dragged into the war." (British White Paper, No. 17, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 271. See also British White Paper, No. 47, Sir Edward Grey to Sir George Buchanan, July 27, 1914; SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 292.)

The same argument was made by the President of the French Republic to the British Ambassador to France, July 30th. (British White Paper, No. 99, SUPPLE-

Sir George Buchanan, on the other hand, took the position that "direct British interests in Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion." But

MENT, Oct. 1914, pp. 331, 332. See also French Yellow Book, No. 47, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 25, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 189; British White Paper, No. 119, Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 31, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 347.) Perhaps the best statement of Great Britain's answer to this line of argument, found in the correspondence, is that made by Sir George Buchanan in conversation with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 27, 1914, when he urged that:

"His excellency was mistaken if he believed that the cause of peace could be promoted by our telling the German Government that they would have to deal with us as well as with Russia and France, if she supported Austria by force of arms. Their attitude would merely be stiffened by such a menace, and we could only induce her to use her influence at Vienna to avert war by approaching her in the capacity of a friend who was anxious to preserve peace." (British White Paper, No. 44, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, pp. 289-290.) See also Sir G. Buchanan's language to M. Sazonof as reported in British White Paper, No. 17, July 25th, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 271.

What would have been the immediate practical effect of the adoption of M. Sazonof's policy it is of course impossible to say. The subsequent course of the negotiations suggests that it might conceivably have been effective for the moment in preventing war. But it is submitted that the peace maintained by such a course could in the nature of things have been only temporary, and that Sir George Buchanan's answer was absolutely sound even although it has turned out as M. Sazonof predicted, that rivers of blood are flowing and England has been dragged into the war. Mr. Bernard Shaw, in his scintillating and amusing "Common sense about the War," has seized upon M. Sazonof's argument, and grafted upon it a charge that Sir Edward Grey by failing to pursue the course suggested entrapped Germany into an untenable position and then "unmasked the Junker-militarist battery" upon the German Ambassador "caught in a death-trap." (*N. Y. Times Current History of the European War*, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 20.) The German Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, evidently does not agree with this view, as appears from the following passage from an authorized interview with him, by Mr. James Creelman:

"It has been suggested, Mr. Chancellor, that the English Government was not frank in dealing with Germany; that if it had announced plainly its intention to take part in the war on the side of the allies the course of Germany might have been wholly different."

"No, the English Government was frank enough about that, and I never had any doubt as to what they intended to do in the event of actual war. Their crime against the world was that they actually had in their power to say whether there should be a world war or not, and with that opportunity in their hands they deliberately supported France and Russia and made an absolute certainty of the greatest disaster in the history of the world." (Press dispatches.) Compare Lord Cromer's remarks in the *London Spectator*, May 1, 1915, p. 611.

he thought that the British Government might perhaps be willing to make strong representations to both German and Austrian Governments, urging upon them that an attack upon Serbia by Austria would endanger the whole peace of Europe.²⁴

Sir George also suggested that "the important point was to induce Austria to extend the time limit." And upon the same day the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs telegraphed in this sense to Vienna, pointing out that Austria-Hungary had declared herself willing to inform the Powers as to the grounds upon which she had acted, and that this implied the allowance of time for the Powers to consider these grounds, and that "in order to prevent the consequences incalculable and equally fatal to all the Powers, which may result from the course of action followed by the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems to us to be above all essential that the period allowed for the Servian reply should be extended."²⁵

The Russian Government asked the Governments of Great Britain, Germany, Italy and France to support this request.²⁶ Great Britain²⁷ and France²⁸ promptly instructed their ambassadors at Vienna in this sense. Italy did the same as soon as the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who happened not to be in Rome, could be reached by tele-

²⁴ British White Paper, No. 6, Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey, July 24, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, pp. 260, 262. Sir George Buchanan's whole dispatch is most interesting, and his conduct on this occasion—which met the full approval and commendation of Sir Edward Grey (see his dispatch of acknowledgment, British White Paper, No. 24, Sir Edward Grey to Sir George Buchanan, July 28, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 275)—is typical of the efficient work done by the members of the British diplomatic corps in every capital of Europe in the days from July 23rd to August 4th. The German army has shown itself no more prepared and efficient in the field of arms than the British Foreign Service in the field of diplomacy.

²⁵ Russian Orange Book, No. 4, July 24, 1914, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna, SUPPLEMENT, Jan. 1915, p. 10.

²⁶ Russian Orange Book, No. 5, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian representatives at London, Berlin, Rome and Paris, July 24, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, Jan. 1915, p. 11.

²⁷ British White Paper, No. 26, Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, July 25, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, pp. 276-277; Russian Orange Book, No. 16, SUPPLEMENT, Jan. 1915, p. 16.

²⁸ Russian Orange Book, No. 15, SUPPLEMENT, Jan. 1915, p. 15; French Yellow Book, No. 39, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 184.

graph.²⁹ At the same time Great Britain³⁰ joined Russia³¹ in urging the German Government also to use its influence at Vienna to obtain an extension of the time limit.³² All was to no avail; while the other governments hesitated and conferred, Germany had already acted.

On July 23rd, the very day the Austrian note was delivered at six o'clock p. m., the Chancellor of the German Empire telegraphed the German Ambassadors in London, Paris and St. Petersburg, the text of a communication which they were each instructed to make to the government to which they were accredited.³³ This communication, after summarizing the recent relations between Austria and Serbia as set forth in the Austrian note, and fully endorsing the Austrian position, continued: "Under these circumstances the course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as equitable and moderate." The German note then referred to the possibility that Serbia might continue recalcitrant and force Austria to proceed to extreme measures, and concluded as follows:

The Imperial Government want to emphasize their opinion that in the present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and that the great Powers ought seriously to endeavor to reserve it to those two immediately

²⁹ French Yellow Book, Nos. 44 and 50, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, pp. 187, 191; British White Paper, No. 40, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 287. The Italian Foreign Minister was not the only European diplomat absent from his post at the time of the delivery of the Austrian note. The President of the French Republic and the President of the Council were at sea returning from a visit to Russia. (British White Paper, No. 6, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 262, etc.) The Russian Ambassador to Austria-Hungary was on leave. (See *supra*, p. 408, note 10.) So was the Italian Ambassador at Berlin. (French Yellow Book, No. 35, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 181). So apparently was the English Ambassador at Berlin, Sir Edward Goschen. (French Yellow Book, No. 73, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 209.) On the other hand, the German Emperor was also absent, cruising in Norwegian waters. He returned suddenly to Berlin, July 26th. (British White Paper, No. 33, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, pp. 280, 281.)

³⁰ British White Paper, No. 11, Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, July 24, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 266; British White Paper, No. 18, Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey, July 25, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 271.

³¹ Russian Orange Book, No. 14, July 25, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, Jan. 1915, p. 15.

³² French Yellow Book, No. 41, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 185.

³³ German White Paper, Annex 1 B, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, pp. 396, 397. The hour at which this telegram was sent is not given.

concerned. The Imperial Government desire urgently the localization of the conflict, because every interference of another Power would, owing to the different treaty obligations, be followed by incalculable consequences.³⁴

This prompt and decisive support, on the part of Germany, of the Austrian note, initiated on the same day the note was delivered, and carried out in London, Paris and St. Petersburg on the 24th, left no doubt of the correctness of M. Sazonof's conclusion that Austria had acted only after consultation with Germany, and this has been placed beyond the realm of dispute by the frank avowal in the German official memorandum upon the negotiations, which, while it denies participation in the textual preparation of the Austrian note, states in the clearest terms that Germany was fully consulted in advance, approved of what was to be done, and gave her ally *carte blanche* as to how it was to be done. The German memorandum, after reviewing the relations between Austria and Serbia, proceeds as follows:

In view of these circumstances Austria had to admit that it would not be consistent either with the dignity or self-preservation of the monarchy to look on longer at the operations on the other side of the border without taking action. The Austro-Hungarian Government advised us of this view of the situation and asked our opinion in the matter. We were able to assure our ally most heartily of our agreement with her view of the situation and to assure her that any action that she might consider it necessary to take in order to put an end to the movement in Serbia directed against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy would receive our approval. We were fully aware in this connection that warlike moves on the part of Austria-Hungary against Serbia would bring Russia into the question and might draw us into a war in accordance with our duties as an ally. * * * We therefore gave Austria an entirely free hand in her action against Serbia. We have taken no part in the preparations.

Austria chose the way, * * * 35

³⁴ British White Paper, No. 9, which gives the text of this note as communicated to Great Britain, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, pp. 263-265. Compare French Yellow Book, No. 28, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 174.

³⁵ Official German memorandum, German White Paper, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, pp. 373, 374. After this unequivocal statement, it becomes entirely immaterial whether or not the German Foreign Office had knowledge of the actual text of the Austrian note prior to its delivery, except as affecting Germany's good faith, in view of the formal and repeated statements of the German Foreign Office that there was

It was indeed a "blank check" ³⁶ which Germany gave her ally, and she must be held to all the customary accountability.

Under these circumstances it was hardly to be anticipated that Germany would use her influence at Vienna to procure an extension of the time limit. And although the German Foreign Office agreed to "pass on" to the Austrian Foreign Office ³⁷ the English suggestion with respect to an extension of the time allowed Serbia for reply, the German Foreign Secretary expressed the opinion that, owing to the absence of the Austrian Foreign Minister at Ischl, "there would be delay and difficulty in getting the time limit extended." And, in a subsequent conversation on the same point with the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, he clearly indi-

no such knowledge. In a *note verbale* handed to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs at St. Petersburg, by the German Ambassador, July 25th, it was stated:

"The German government had no knowledge of the text of the Austrian note before it was presented, and exercised no influence upon its contents. A threatening attitude is wrongly attributed to Germany." (Russian Orange Paper, No. 18, SUPPLEMENT, Jan. 1915, p. 17.) For similar declarations at Berlin see French Yellow Book, Nos. 15, 30, 41; British White Paper, No. 2. At London, Russian Orange Paper, No. 20. At Paris, French Yellow Book, Nos. 36 and 57; Russian Orange Paper, No. 19.

Considerable surprise and some incredulity is expressed in various quarters, in the course of the diplomatic correspondence in regard to the German statement on this point (for instance, see the French Yellow Book, Nos. 15, 30, 41, 57), and one or two hearsay statements are recorded as justifying this incredulity. (French Yellow Book, No. 21; British White Paper, No. 95; Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, September 1, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, Jan. 1915, p. 1.) But these statements are not of a character in themselves to entitle them to serious consideration as against the official German statements to the contrary. As a matter of reasoning on the facts, the German admission of prior consultation with Austria and approval of Austria's course and full assumption of responsibility for the Austrian note appears to furnish an adequate explanation of what happened. And it would seem more in accordance with the theory which Germany had determined to apply, *i. e.*, that "the question at issue was one for settlement between Serbia and Austria alone" for the German Foreign Office to abstain from collaboration in the textual preparation of the Austrian note, or knowledge of its contents in advance of delivery. (See British White Paper, No. 2, Sir Edward Goschen to Sir Edward Grey, July 22; SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 252.) The substance of the note having been agreed upon, it was possibly deemed better for Germany to be in a position to plead ignorance of the precise wording, and this course was more in accordance with the dignity of Austria as a great Power.

³⁶ French Yellow Book, No. 41, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, July 25, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 185.

³⁷ British White Paper, No. 18, July 25, 1914, Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 271.

cated his doubt as to the wisdom of Austria's yielding, and declined to do anything more than transmit the Russian request.³⁸

On the same day the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna, in accordance with his instructions, took up with the Austrian Foreign Office in person and with Count Berchtold at Ischl by telegraph, the question of securing an extension of the time limit. Baron Macchio at the Austrian Foreign Office, while promising to communicate with Count Berchtold, added that "he had no hesitation in predicting a categorical refusal,"³⁹ a prediction which was verified later on in the day.⁴⁰ A dispatch of the Austrian Secretary for Foreign Affairs to the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg of that day explains authoritatively the reasons for this refusal. Count Berchtold, with evident approval, reports that the first Department Chief (Baron Macchio)

replied to the [Russian] Chargé d'Affaires that he would advise me at once of his request, but he could already venture to say that there is no probability of a prolongation of the stipulated time-limit being conceded by us.

As to the explanations given by the Russian Government in substantiation of its request, they appear to be based upon an erroneous conception of the premises. Our note to the Powers was by no means meant as an invitation to them to inform us of their views on this matter, but simply to convey information as a matter of international courtesy. Besides, we hold that our action concerns solely ourselves and Servia, and that this action, despite the patience and leniency which we have displayed for many years, had been forced upon us by the developments of a situation which compelled us to defend our most vital interests.⁴¹

With this categorical refusal of the Austrian Foreign Office to extend the 48 hour time limit of the note to Servia, on the ground that Austro-

³⁸ Russian Orange Book, No. 14, SUPPLEMENT, Jan. 1915, p. 15.

³⁹ Russian Orange Book, No. 11, July 25, 1914, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, SUPPLEMENT, Jan. 1915, p. 14. See French Yellow Book, No. 45, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 188.

⁴⁰ Russian Orange Book, No. 12, SUPPLEMENT, Jan. 1915, p. 14; Austrian Red Book, No. 20, July 25, 1914.

⁴¹ Austrian Red Book No. 21, Count Berchtold to Count Szapary, July 25, 1914. The memorandum introductory to the Austrian Red Book says on this point: "Russia's proposal to extend the time-limit for the Servian answer would have furnished the Belgrade Government with the opportunity for underhanded procrastination, and would have opened the door to the intervention of other Powers on Servia's behalf. An extension of the time-limit had, therefore, to be declined."

Servian relations concerned only the countries immediately involved, the first of the efforts made by the Powers of the Triple Entente ⁴² to avert a general European war had failed.

THE SERVIAN REPLY

At the expiration of the time limit at six o'clock p. m. on July 25th, Servia replied to the Austrian note. Owing to advice which had apparently been given to the Servian Government by the Powers of the Triple Entente, particularly Russia,⁴³ the Servian reply was unques-

⁴² The instructions of the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs to support the Russian request for more time arrived too late to be acted on, and the same was true of the French instructions which arrived just as the time limit expired. (French Yellow Book, No. 48, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 190).

⁴³ The Prince Regent of Servia appealed to the Czar for assistance, and promised to abide by his advice, July 24th. (Russian Orange Book, No. 6, SUPPLEMENT, Jan. 1915, pp. 11, 12.) No note embodying the Russian advice appears in the Russian Orange Book, prior to the general pacific advice contained in telegram of the Czar to the Prince Regent, July 27th, two days after the Servian reply. (Russian Orange Book, No. 40, SUPPLEMENT, Jan. 1915, p. 27.) But there seems every reason to believe that the advice must have been given. The Russian Ambassador at Vienna said to the British Ambassador "that Russia had counselled Servia to yield * * * as far as she possibly could without sacrificing her independence." (See British White Paper, No. 118, July 31, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 346.) And the British representative at Belgrade telegraphed Sir Edward Grey, July 25, "I think it is highly probable that the Russian Government have already urged the utmost moderation on the Servian Government." (British White Paper, No. 22, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 274.) See also British White Paper, No. 46, Sir Edward Grey to Sir Edward Goschen, July 27, 1914, "I assumed that Servian reply could not have gone as far as it did unless Russia had exercised conciliatory influence at Belgrade."

As for the advice given by the French Government, see French Yellow Book, Nos. 26 and 36, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, pp. 172, 181; and British White Paper, No. 15, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 269.

Sir A. Nicholson, of the English Foreign Office, in conversation with the Servian Minister, July 3rd, expressed the hope "that Servia would endeavor to meet the Austrian demands in a conciliatory and moderate spirit." (British White Paper, No. 30, Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe, July 25, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, pp. 278, 279.)

For Sir Edward Grey's official advice in the same sense, see British White Paper, No. 12, July 24, 1914, Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 267. This advice, however, appears not to have actually been tendered directly by the British representative at Belgrade (British White Paper, No. 22, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 274. See also British White Paper, No. 17, SUPPLEMENT.

tionably conciliatory in tone. But a sharp difference of opinion at once developed between the Powers of the Triple Entente and Germany and Austria, as to whether or not it was substantially responsive to the Austrian demands, or at least sufficiently so to afford a proper basis for discussion. M. Sazonof telegraphed the Russian Ambassadors to the Powers that the reply "exceeds all our expectations in its moderation and in its desire to afford the fullest satisfaction to Austria."⁴⁴ M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, referred to the reply as "Serbia's submission."⁴⁵ Sir Edward Grey likewise thought that the "Servian reply went further than could have been expected, to meet the Austrian demands,⁴⁶ and "involved the greatest humiliation to Serbia that I [he] had ever seen a country undergo."⁴⁷ The German Chancellor was of the opinion that although the note showed "a certain desire to meet the demands of Austria" nevertheless "without some sure guarantees that Serbia would carry out in their entirety the demands made upon her, the Austro-Hungarian Government could not rest satisfied in view of their past experience;"⁴⁸ while the German Ambassador at Vienna thought "that Servian concessions were all a sham."⁴⁹ Count Berchtold, the Austrian Foreign Minister, said that "the Servian reply itself furnished proof of the insincerity of Serbia's promises for the future."⁵⁰ And that Serbia "had endeavored to ex-

Oct. 1914, p. 270). But it undoubtedly reached Serbia in substance and effect through French and Russian channels.

⁴⁴ Russian Orange Book, No. 33, July 27, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, Jan. 1915, p. 24.

⁴⁵ French Yellow Book, No. 61, July 27, 1914, Circular instructions of M. Bienvenu-Martin, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 201. See also French Yellow Book, No. 56, July 26, 1914, Circular instruction of M. Bienvenu-Martin in which he speaks of the Servian Government having "given way on all points with the exception of two small reservations."

⁴⁶ British White Paper, No. 46, July 27, Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 291.

⁴⁷ British White Paper, No. 48, July 27, Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 292 at 294.

⁴⁸ British White Paper, No. 75, July 29, Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 311.

⁴⁹ British White Paper, No. 32, July 26, 1914, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, pp. 279, 280.

⁵⁰ British White Paper, No. 93, July 28, Russian Ambassador to Vienna, to M. Sazonof, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 325.

tricate herself from an embarrassing situation by means of quibbles. With such tactics we were only too familiar.”⁵¹ An official Austrian communiqué announced that “a spirit of insincerity pervades the whole of this reply”⁵² and the Austrian Foreign Office, under date of July 27th, made detailed observations upon the terms of the Servian reply,⁵³ with a view to substantiating these charges,—observations which drew from the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs in conversation with the British Ambassador the remark that he considered many points made therein “quite childish.”⁵⁴ Inasmuch as the Servian reply was speedily overtaken and over-shadowed by other and more important questions which arose in the course of the negotiations, it is not necessary to examine the reply and the Austrian comments in detail. It will be sufficient to call attention to the four points which alone appear to have given rise to any difficulty in the discussions which took place between the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg.⁵⁵

Austria's first demand was for the suppression of all anti-Austrian publications. In reply to this the Servian Government pledged itself to amend the press law at the next session of the Skuptchina, so as to make anti-Austrian publications severely punishable, and to amend the Servian Constitution “at the approaching revision of the Constitu-

⁵¹ Austrian Red Book, No. 41, July 28, 1914, Count Berchtold to Austrian Ambassador at London.

⁵² French Yellow Book, No. 75, July 28, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 212. The personal views of the Austrian and German Ambassadors at Paris as reported by the French Foreign Office (Russian Orange Book, No. 27, July 26th, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and French Yellow Book, No. 57, July 26, 1914, note for the Minister) do not appear to be entitled to any particular weight, inasmuch as the Ambassadors had at that time apparently not seen the text of the Servian reply.

⁵³ Austrian Red Book, No. 34, July 27th, Count Berchtold to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors in Berlin, London, Rome, Paris and St. Petersburg. See also German White Book, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, pp. 386-393.

⁵⁴ British White Paper, No. 64, July 28, 1914, Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 304.

⁵⁵ Russian Orange Book, No. 25, July 26, 1914, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Russian Ambassador at Vienna, SUPPLEMENT, Jan. 1915, p. 20; Austrian Red Book, No. 31, July 27, 1914, Count Szapary, Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Count Berchtold.

tion”⁵⁶ so as to provide for the confiscation of offending publications. The Austrian Government, in commenting on this reply, took the position that Austria had sought to be sure that Servian press attacks would cease in the future, whereas Serbia only offered “to make certain laws that may lead to the above result.”⁵⁷ It is submitted, however, that although Austria was in a sense correct in her contention that she was not interested in the internal processes whereby Serbia complied with her demands, but only in actual compliance, nevertheless it was unreasonable for her in a matter of this character to call upon Serbia to abandon the ordinary processes of civilized government in order to make instant compliance with Austria’s very extreme demands. If Austria feared that the ordinary processes of constitutional government would take too much time, doubtless an agreement could have been had that these processes should be accelerated in the particular case. It is submitted that the Servian reply on this point was reasonable and substantially responsive to the Austrian demand.

Austria’s fourth demand was for the removal from both the military and civil service of Serbia of “all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserves to itself the right to communicate to the Royal Government.”⁵⁸ The Servian reply stipulates that such officers only shall be removed who are proved “by legal investigation” to have “implicated themselves in acts directed against the territorial integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.”⁵⁹ Austria observes that this calls for conviction after a legal trial for “an anti-Austrian propaganda which in Serbia is not usually punishable by law,” and therefore is unsatisfactory. It would seem unreasonable for Austria to require the dismissal of all Servian officials who might subsequently be named by Austria without furnishing Serbia any proof of the offense which they were alleged to have committed, or permitting any investigation on her part. On the other hand, if Serbia by her reply intended to

⁵⁶ British White Paper, No. 39, Reply of Servian Government to Austro-Hungarian note, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, pp. 283-287; Austrian Red Book, No. 34.

⁵⁷ German White Paper, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, 389.

⁵⁸ British White Paper, No. 4, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 256.

⁵⁹ SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 1914, p. 390.

limit compliance to a dismissal of officers convicted of crimes in the ordinary courts, it is easy to see that this might not meet the difficulty at which Austria aimed. But the difference, it is submitted, was quite susceptible of explanation and adjustment, granting a reasonable desire for adjustment on both sides.

Servia's reply to Austria's demand No. 5, was as follows:

5. The Royal Servian Government must confess that it is not quite clear as to the sense and scope of the desire of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the effect that the Royal Servian Government bind itself to allow the co-operation within its territory of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government, but it nevertheless declares itself willing to permit such co-operation as might be in conformity with international law and criminal procedure, as well as with friendly neighborly relations.⁶⁰

With reference to this point the Austrian Government observes:

International law has as little to do with this question as criminal procedure. The question is purely one of national policing, to be solved by special agreement. Servia's statement is, therefore, incomprehensible and, on account of its vague form, would give rise to insurmountable difficulties if an endeavor were made to arrange the agreement.⁶¹

However, under date of July 25th, Count Berchtold instructed the Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg to make confidential explanations to the Russian Government in regard to the meaning of Austrian demand No. 5, to the effect that it did not contemplate any "impairment of the sovereignty of Servia." Count Berchtold adds, "The 'collaboration' mentioned in clause 5 refers to the creation in Belgrade of a secret *bureau de sûreté* which would work like the similar Russian institution in Paris and would coöperate with the Servian police and administration."⁶² Servia had not refused the Austrian demand on this point. Each government was claiming not to understand the precise meaning of the other, and Austria stood ready to explain her demand to Russia. This would seem, therefore, to be a case for mutual explanations before a punitive expedition was resorted to.

⁶⁰ SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, pp. 390, 391. It will be remembered that the coöperation demanded was "in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy."

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 391.

⁶² Austrian Red Book, No. 27, Count Berchtold to Count Szapary in St. Petersburg, July 25, 1914.

The difficulty with respect to Austria's sixth demand was of a similar character. The Servian reply reads:

6. The Royal Government naturally holds itself bound to institute an investigation against all such persons as were concerned in the plot of June 15th-28th, or are supposed to have been concerned in it, and are on Servian soil. As to the co-operation of special delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government in this investigation, the Servian Government cannot accept such co-operation, since this would be a violation of the laws and criminal procedure. However, in individual cases, information as to the progress of the investigation might be given the Austro-Hungarian delegates.⁶³

As to this the Austrian Government comments that the Austrian demand was for participation on the part of Austrian representatives in the preliminary investigation, not the trial “(*recherche* in contradistinction to *enquête judiciaire*);” and that “if the Servian Government misunderstands us it does so purposely, since the difference between *enquête judiciaire* and the simple *recherches* must certainly be plain to it.” Here again it would seem that irrespective of whether the Servian misunderstanding was real or assumed, Austria, if she really desired a peaceful solution, could have afforded to clear the point up by supplementary explanations before drawing the sword. Of course the real truth of the matter was, as appears over and over in the correspondence, that the Austrian Government and people, rightly or wrongly, thoroughly distrusted the Servian Government and people—to put it mildly; and therefore deemed themselves justified in refusing to deal with them upon the basis upon which one self-respecting nation deals with another, no matter how small or weak. As Count Mensdorff, the Austrian Ambassador to London, admitted, “on paper the Servian reply might seem to be satisfactory;” but he contended “the Servians had refused the one thing—the coöperation of Austrian officials and police—which would be a real guarantee that in practice the Servians would not carry on their subversive campaign against Austria.”⁶⁴

The Servian reply concludes as follows:

If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply, the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the common

⁶³ SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 391.

⁶⁴ British White Paper, No. 48, July 27, Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 292 at 294.

interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of The Hague, or to the great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18th (31st) March, 1909.⁶⁵

It is easy to understand the reasons which rendered Austria unwilling to submit her demands, which were so largely political in character, to The Hague Tribunal. This was not pressed in any quarter. But Servia's other suggestion, that her alleged breach of an engagement which had been framed by the great Powers, be submitted to these same Powers for consideration, was destined to loom large in the remainder of the negotiations.⁶⁶

SIR EDWARD GREY'S ATTEMPTS AT MEDIATION. AUSTRIA DECLARES WAR ON SERVIA

The Servian reply was handed to the Austrian Minister at Belgrade at six o'clock July 25th, at the expiration of the time limit. The reply was pronounced unsatisfactory by the Austrian Minister, who left Belgrade at six-thirty.⁶⁷ The Servian Government, which had ordered mobilization at three o'clock the afternoon of the 25th,⁶⁸ at once transferred itself from Belgrade to Nish, where the Skuptchina was summoned to meet on Monday the 27th.⁶⁹ Austria also proceeded to make military preparations,⁷⁰ and the German Secretary of State spoke of her intention "to give the Servians a lesson,"⁷¹ although it was, in his opinion,

⁶⁵ British White Paper, No. 39, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 283 at 287.

⁶⁶ Compare the advice given to the Servian Minister at Paris by M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, July 24, 1914, "above all, to attempt to escape from the direct grip of Austria by declaring herself ready to submit to the arbitration of Europe." (French Yellow Book, No. 26, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 172. See *supra*, p. 420, note 41.)

⁶⁷ British White Paper, No. 23, July 25th, Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 274.

⁶⁸ French Yellow Book, No. 50, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 191; Austrian Red Book, Nos. 29, 30, 39, 40.

⁶⁹ British White Paper, No. 23, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 274; French Yellow Book, No. 50, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 191.

⁷⁰ French Yellow Book, No. 51, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 193.

⁷¹ British White Paper, No. 18, July 25, 1914, Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 271.

"no question of a war, but of an 'execution' in a local matter."⁷² But Austria had explained on the 24th to Sir Edward Grey that the Austrian note was not to be considered as a formal ultimatum, but a "demarche with a time limit" to be followed, if not complied with, by "military preparations, not operations."⁷³ And Sir Edward Grey, who already on July 24th, in view of the seriousness of the situation, had suggested that the four great Powers not directly interested—Germany, Italy, France and Great Britain—"should work together simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favor of moderation in the event of relations between Austria and Russia becoming threatening,"⁷⁴ took advantage of the further respite thus promised before "any irretrievable steps were taken"⁷⁵ to continue his efforts to find a peaceful solution of the situation. In the course of these efforts one suggestion after another was put forward, abandoned, and then perhaps recurred to; and sometimes two or more plans were being tried out simultaneously. At the same time, events were moving so rapidly that instructions given in the morning by telegraph became out of date before they could possibly be carried out, and had to be superseded by others, later in the day.

For the sake of orderly statement, it seems desirable to consider these various plans separately, so far as possible, bearing in mind, however, that, as the dates in the foot-notes will show, they were not considered separately by the negotiators, but were intertwined with one another in almost kaleidoscopic confusion. It should also be remembered that although these plans are ordinarily and properly referred to as Sir Ed-

⁷² French Yellow Book, No. 43, July 25th, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 186.

⁷³ British White Paper, No. 14, July 25th, Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie and Sir George Buchanan, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, pp. 268, 269. In Count Berchtold's original instructions to the Austrian Ambassador in London the Ambassador was directed to communicate this information as "strictly confidential." (Austrian Red Book, No. 17.)

⁷⁴ British White Paper, No. 11, July 24th, Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, Counselor of the British Embassy at Berlin, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 266. See also British White Paper, No. 10, Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 265.

⁷⁵ British White Paper, No. 26, July 25, 1914, Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, pp. 276, 277.

ward Grey's plans, and although he was their chief initiator, and on account of the peculiar position which England held to the situation, of necessity their chief proponent, his efforts were ably seconded by the French and Russian Foreign Offices, and by the Ambassadors of the three Entente Powers, particularly by M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, whose contributions to the negotiations will be more particularly referred to later on.

The Suggestion that Austria Should Regard the Servian Reply as a Basis for Discussion

When first advised by the British Chargé in Belgrade of what the substance of the Servian reply was expected to be, Sir Edward Grey expressed to the German Ambassador the hope "that the German Government will feel able to influence the Austrian Government to take a favorable view of it."⁷⁶ This suggestion was at once seconded at Berlin and Vienna by the Italian Government.⁷⁷ But the most that the German Government would do with this suggestion was to "pass it on" to the Cabinet at Vienna.⁷⁸ It came to nothing; but its fate is not even recorded in the published correspondence. After the full text of the Servian reply had been received in London on July 27th, Sir Edward Grey again urged upon the German Ambassador that it should "at least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause," and that the "German Government should urge this at Vienna."⁷⁹ This suggestion was also transmitted to Vienna by the German Government;⁸⁰ but the Austrian Government declined to act on Sir Edward Grey's suggestion. The grounds of its refusal are stated in a memorandum transmitted to the German Govern-

⁷⁶ British White Paper, No. 27, July 25th, Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Sir H. Rumbold and Sir George Buchanan, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 277.

⁷⁷ British White Paper, No. 63, July 28, 1914, Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 304.

⁷⁸ British White Paper, No. 34, July 26, 1914, Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 281.

⁷⁹ British White Paper, No. 46, July 27th, Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 291.

⁸⁰ German official memorandum, German White Book, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 377; British White Paper, No. 67, July 28, 1914, Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, pp. 305, 306; Austrian Red Book, No. 43, July 28th, Count Berchtold to Count Szogyeny in Berlin.

ment on July 29th, after the opening of hostilities between Austria and Servia. They are, first,

that Servia's reply by no means conveys an assent to all our demands with one sole exception, as Sir Edward Grey seems to assume, but on the contrary, contains reservations in almost every clause, so that the value of the concessions is essentially reduced. The clause which has been entirely rejected covers the very points which would have afforded us some guarantee for the realization of our object.⁸¹

And second, that the Austrian Government

to its sincere regret, no longer is in a position to meet the Servian reply in the spirit of the British suggestions, since at the time when the German request was presented here, a state of war already existed between the Dual Monarchy and Servia, and thus the Servian reply had been superseded by events.⁸¹

The German official memorandum on the negotiations, published in the German White Book, only makes mention of the second ground upon which Austria refused to regard the Servian note as a basis for discussion. The German memorandum on this point reads:

The Austro-Hungarian Government, in full appreciation of our mediatory activity, replied to this proposal that, coming as it did after the opening of hostilities, it was too late.⁸²

Sir Edward Grey had, however, also telegraphed his suggestion that the Servian note be made the basis for discussion and pause, direct to the British Ambassador at Vienna, and it was presented on July 28th, before the Austrian declaration of war. But to no avail. Sir M. de Bunsen reports that the "Minister for Foreign Affairs said, quietly but firmly, that no discussion could be accepted on basis of Servian note; that war would be declared today, and that well-known pacific character of Emperor as well as, he might add, his own, might be accepted as a guarantee that war was both just and inevitable."⁸³ It would seem,

⁸¹ Austrian Red Book, No. 44, Count Berchtold to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors in St. Petersburg, London, Paris and Rome.

⁸² German White Book, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 377. See also British White Paper, No. 75, July 29, 1914, Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 311.

⁸³ British White Paper, No. 62, July 28th, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 303.

therefore, that the refusal of the Austrian Government to consider Sir Edward Grey's suggestion that the Servian reply be made a basis for discussion—a suggestion twice presented in Vienna before the Austrian declaration of war—must be defended, if at all, upon the unsatisfactory character of the reply, and not upon the ground that the suggestion came too late for consideration.

Although the Austrian declaration of war on Servia naturally put an end to the idea of further discussions on the basis of the Servian reply, between Austria and Servia, substantially the same idea recurs again and again during the negotiations in the various proposals for conversations between Austria and Russia, with a view to so modifying or interpreting the Austrian note as to admit of its acceptance by Servia.

Mediation by a Conference of the Four Powers

Sir Edward Grey's original suggestion that the four great Powers not directly interested—Germany, Italy, France and Great Britain—should use their influence at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favor of peace was cordially accepted and supported by France.⁸⁴ Italy was evidently ready to do her part⁸⁵ and the German Foreign Office appeared to regard the general suggestion hopefully. As early as July 25th the British Embassy at Berlin reported to Sir Edward Grey that the German Secretary of State had said that "if the relations between Austria and Russia became threatening he was quite ready to fall in with your suggestion as to the four Powers working in favor of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburg."⁸⁶ Sir Edward Grey had pointed out that he was interested in the matter not because of any British interest in the original difference between Austria and Servia, but solely because the peace of Europe

⁸⁴ French Yellow Book, No. 56, July 26, 1914, Circular instruction of M. Bienvenu-Martin, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 196; French Yellow Book, No. 50, July 26, 1914; British White Paper, No. 51, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 296.

⁸⁵ French Yellow Book, No. 51, July 26, 1914, M. Barrere, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 193.

⁸⁶ British White Paper, No. 18, July 25, Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, pp. 71, 72; French Yellow Book, No. 67, July 27, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 205.

might become involved⁸⁷ through the entry of Russia into the conflict. The German Foreign Office emphasized this point of view, and made it clear that it would not be a party to any interposition between Austria and Servia.⁸⁸ This distinction, however, obviously could have no practical meaning since the difference between Austria and Russia resulted from the difference between Austria and Servia and could only be adjusted by adjusting that difference.⁸⁹ And difficulties speedily developed when it was sought to put the proposed plan for four Power mediation into practice.

On July 26th Sir Edward Grey suggested that the Ambassadors of France, Italy and Germany be instructed to confer with him at London "for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications," Servia, Austria and Russia meanwhile being requested to suspend "active military operations," pending the conference.⁹⁰ France⁹¹ and Italy⁹² accepted this proposition at once.⁹³ The Russian Foreign Minister replied that he had begun conversations with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, under conditions which led him to hope for favorable results; but if these conversations proved ineffectual, he was

⁸⁷ British White Paper, No. 25, July 25, Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 276.

⁸⁸ German White Book, Annex 13, July 25, 1914, telegram from the Imperial German Chancellor to the German Ambassador to London, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 403.

⁸⁹ French Yellow Book, No. 74, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 27th, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 210; Austrian Red Book, No. 47, July 29, 1914, Count Szapary to Count Berchtold.

⁹⁰ British White Paper, No. 36, July 26, Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie and Sir R. Rodd, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 282.

⁹¹ French Yellow Book, No. 70, July 27, M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 207; British White Paper, No. 42, July 27, Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 288; British White Paper, No. 51, July 27, Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 296; British White Paper, No. 52, July 28, note communicated by the French Embassy, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 297.

⁹² British White Paper, No. 35, July 26, Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 281; British White Paper, No. 49, July 27, Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, pp. 294, 295.

⁹³ Italy accepted the same day the proposition was made—July 26th—France on July 27th.

"ready to accept the British proposal or any other proposal of a kind that would bring about a favorable solution of the conflict." ⁹⁴

Sir Edward Grey's proposal was brought to the attention of the German Foreign Secretary by the British, French and Italian Ambassadors on July 27th.⁹⁵ In talking to the British Ambassador, Herr von Jagow raised the objection that the proposed conference "would practically amount to a court of arbitration, and could not in his opinion be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia." The British Ambassador replied that he was sure that Sir Edward Grey's idea "had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation." ⁹⁶ But the German Foreign Secretary still maintained that "such a conference was not practicable." ⁹⁷ Finally he referred to the proposed conversations between the Ministers for Foreign Affairs for Germany and Austria, and expressed the opinion that it would be best to await the outcome of these conversations.⁹⁷

When M. Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador, in his turn supported the British proposal for a conference in a conversation with the German Foreign Secretary and received the same answer which had been given to the British Ambassador, he records that he made the following reply:

I replied to Herr von Jagow that I regretted his answer, but that the great object which Sir Edward Grey had in view went beyond any question of form; that what was important was the coöperation of England

⁹⁴ British White Paper, No. 53, July 27, M. Sazonof, Russian Premier, to Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, communicated July 28, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, pp. 297, 298; Russian Orange Book, No. 32, SUPPLEMENT, Jan. 1915, p. 23; British White Paper, No. 55, July 27, Sir George Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, received July 28, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, pp. 298, 299; French Yellow Book, No. 80, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 229.

⁹⁵ British White Paper, No. 43, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 288; French Yellow Book, Nos. 74, 81, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, pp. 210, 230.

⁹⁶ British White Paper, No. 43, July 27, Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey. This explanation was confirmed by Sir Edward Grey the next day. British White Paper, No. 67, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 305. Compare Ambassador Jules Cambon's account of this interview between Herr von Jagow and Sir E. Goschen, French Yellow Book, No. 73, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 209.

⁹⁷ British White Paper, No. 43, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 288.

and France with Germany and Italy in a work of peace; that this co-operation could take effect through common *démarches* at St. Petersburg and at Vienna; that he had often expressed to me his regret at seeing the two allied groups always opposed to one another in Europe; that there was here an opportunity of proving that there was a European spirit, by showing four Powers belonging to the two groups acting in common agreement to prevent a conflict.⁹⁸

Herr von Jagow then referred to Germany's engagements to Austria. M. Cambon countered with France's engagements to Russia. The Secretary of State set up the distinction between an Austro-Russian and an Austro-Servian dispute. M. Cambon replied that the "one is the consequence of the other." His account proceeds:

As the Secretary of State persisted in saying that he was obliged to keep his engagements towards Austria, I asked him if he was bound to follow her everywhere with his eyes blindfolded, and if he had taken note of the reply of Servia to Austria which the Servian *Chargé d'Affaires* had delivered to him this morning. "I have not yet had time," he said. "I regret it. You would see that except on some points of detail Servia has yielded entirely." * * * As Herr von Jagow gave me no clear reply, I asked him whether Germany wished for war. He protested energetically, saying that he knew what was in my mind, but that it was wholly incorrect. * * * Herr von Jagow protested anew that he was ready to join England and France in a common effort, but that it was necessary to find a form for this intervention which he could accept, and that the Cabinets must come to an understanding on this point.⁹⁹

The German Foreign Secretary then spoke hopefully of direct conversations between Berlin and St. Petersburg. M. Cambon concludes his account of this interview, one of the most interesting documents in the whole diplomatic correspondence, as follows:

In my opinion it would be well to ask Sir Edward Grey, who must have been warned by Sir Edward Goschen of the refusal to his proposal in the form in which it was made, to renew it under another form, so that Germany would have no pretext for refusing to associate herself with it, and would have to assume the responsibilities that belong to her in the eyes of England.⁹⁹

⁹⁸ French Yellow Book, No. 74, July 27, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 210.

⁹⁹ French Yellow Book, No. 74, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 210.

On the same day that these interviews were taking place in Berlin, the German Ambassador in London assured Sir Edward Grey that the German Government accepted the proposition for mediation between Austria and Russia "in principle."¹⁰⁰

The next morning, July 28th, the British, French and Italian Ambassadors in Berlin, on comparing notes on their respective conferences of the day before with Herr von Jagow agreed, in the language of the French Ambassador, that the German Foreign Secretary's position was one of "accepting in principle the idea of joining in a *démarche* with England, Italy and ourselves, but rejecting any idea of a conference."¹⁰¹ M. Cambon adds: "To place the responsibility in the proper quarter, we must take care to ask Germany to state precisely what she wishes."¹⁰² Sir E. Goschen in reporting this interview of the Ambassadors, says,

We found that while refusing the proposed conference, he (the German Foreign Secretary) had said to all of us that nevertheless he desired to work with us for the maintenance of general peace. We therefore deduce that if he is sincere in this wish he can only be objecting to the form of your proposal.¹⁰³

And very possibly as a result of a suggestion from M. Jules Cambon, Sir E. Goschen adds, "perhaps he himself could be induced to suggest lines on which he would find it possible to work with us." The evening of the same day (July 28th) the German Chancellor sent for Sir E. Goschen and went over the ground with him once more, explaining that he could not accept the conference idea because it would in his opinion "have had appearance of an areopagus consisting of two Powers of each group sitting in judgment upon the two remaining Powers," and adding, "his inability to accept proposed conference must not be regarded as militating against his strong desire for effective coöperation. * * * A

¹⁰⁰ British White Paper, No. 46, Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 291.

¹⁰¹ French Yellow Book, No. 81, July 28, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 230.

¹⁰² French Yellow Book, No. 81.

¹⁰³ British White Paper, No. 60, July 28, Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 202.

war between the great Powers must be avoided" were his last words."¹⁰⁴

Direct Conversations Between Austria and Russia

The method upon which the German Government apparently relied to handle the situation and avoid war between the great Powers was, as we have seen, that of direct conversations between Austria and Russia. This method, which was at once cordially welcomed by Great Britain,¹⁰⁵ appears to have been originally suggested by the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.¹⁰⁶ But just how far the German Government was willing to go in furthering these conversations is not clearly apparent from the correspondence. In reporting his interview with the German Chancellor on the evening of July 28th, already referred to, Sir E. Goschen quotes him as giving assurances "that he was doing his very best both at Vienna and St. Petersburg to get the two governments to discuss the situation directly with each other, and in a friendly way."¹⁰⁷ But the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, who had been instructed to ask the German Minister for Foreign Affairs to support in Vienna the Russian proposal that there should be a private exchange of views between the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg and the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, with a view to drawing up a "wording of the Austro-Hungarian demands which would be acceptable to both parties," obtained a somewhat different impression of the German attitude. He reports that

Jagow answered that he was aware of this proposal, and that he agreed with Pourtalès [the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg] that as Szapary [the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg] had begun this conversation he might as well go on with it. He would telegraph in

¹⁰⁴ British White Paper, No. 71, July 28, Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 308.

¹⁰⁵ British White Paper, No. 67, July 28, Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, pp. 305-306; No. 69, July 28, Sir Edward Grey to Sir George Buchanan, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, pp. 306-7.

¹⁰⁶ British White Paper, No. 78, July 29, Sir George Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 313. See also British White Paper, No. 55, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 299.

¹⁰⁷ British White Paper, No. 71, July 28, 1914, Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 308.

this sense to the German Ambassador at Vienna. I begged him to press Vienna with greater insistence to adopt this conciliatory line; Jagow answered that he could not advise Austria to give way.¹⁰⁸

And the telegram of the German Chancellor to the German Ambassador in London, of the same date, bears out this impression. It merely says: "We have communicated to Count Berchtold the wish of Mr. Sazonof for a direct talk with Vienna;"¹⁰⁹ *i. e.*, it would seem that the Russian suggestion had again merely been "passed on."

The official German memorandum which accompanies and explains the correspondence submitted in the German White Paper makes no direct reference to the Austro-Russian conversations at this stage of the proceedings,¹¹⁰ although it does refer to Germany's mediatory activity in bringing about the resumption of these conversations at a later stage, on July 29th.¹¹¹ But whatever may have been the degree of support lent by Germany to these conversations, it was insufficient, for they were halted almost before they were officially begun, by a refusal on the part of the Austrian Government to discuss the essential matter at issue, *i. e.*, the terms of the Austrian note and the Servian reply.

To understand the course taken by the conversations it is necessary to recur to the situation on July 25th, when Austria declined to extend the time limit, declared the Servian reply unsatisfactory, and broke off diplomatic relations with Servia. At this time Count Berchtold, the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, sent an elaborate confidential dispatch to the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, which, differing from the tone of assured optimism which pervaded the conversations and public communications of the German Foreign Office and Ambassadors during this period of the negotiations, showed a frank recognition of the serious possibilities of the situation, and instructed the Austrian

¹⁰⁸ Russian Orange Book, No. 38, July 27, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, SUPPLEMENT, Jan. 1915, p. 26. Compare French Yellow Book, No. 81, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 28, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 230.

¹⁰⁹ German White Paper, Annex 15, telegram of Imperial German Chancellor to the Imperial German Ambassador in London, July 27, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 404.

¹¹⁰ See German memorandum, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, pp. 372-377.

¹¹¹ SUPPLEMENT, October, 1914, p. 378.

Ambassador generally as to the line he was to take in endeavoring to prevent Russian intervention in the Austro-Servian dispute. Count Berchtold's recognition of the gravity of the situation which had arisen sufficiently appears from the opening paragraphs of this dispatch, which read as follows:

In resolving to proceed firmly against Servia, we are fully aware that a conflict with Russia may result from the existing Servian differences. Yet, in determining our attitude toward Servia, we could not allow ourselves to be influenced by this possibility, because fundamental considerations of our home policy have forced us to put an end to a situation which enables Servia, under Russia's promise of immunity, to threaten this empire constantly and to do so unpunished and unpunishable.

In case Russia should consider that *the moment for an accounting with the Central European Powers has come*, and therefore *a priori* be resolved to make war, the following instructions would appear to be useless.¹¹²

Count Berchtold proceeds to set forth the motives and intentions of Austria, emphasizing the point that Austria is not acting from selfish motives, and giving the general assurance that

although we have no ambitions for territorial expansion and do not intend to infringe upon the integrity of Servia, as you already have pointed out, still we are determined to go to any length to ensure the acceptance of our demands.¹¹³

The dispatch concludes with the further assurance that "our action against Servia, whatever form it may take, is altogether conservative and has no object except the necessary maintenance of our position in Europe."¹¹³ This dispatch was not intended for textual communication to the Russian Government, but merely for the general guidance of the Ambassador and subject to his discretion as to the time and manner in which the ideas therein contained should be availed of in his communications with the Russian Government. The dispatch reads on this point: * * * it is left to your discretion to make proper use of it at the right time and in a suitable manner in your conference with M. Sazonof and the Prime Minister.¹¹³

¹¹² Austrian Red Book, No. 26, July 25, 1914, Count Berchtold to Count Szapary, in St. Petersburg. (Italics the author's.)

¹¹³ Austrian Red Book, No. 26, Count Berchtold to Count Szapary, in St. Petersburg, July 25, 1914.

The diplomatic correspondence does not definitely show the time and manner in

Apparently the Austrian Ambassador did not see any suitable opportunity to carry out his instructions until the afternoon of the next day, the 26th, when, according to the account of M. Paléologue, the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, he was sent for by the Russian Foreign Minister in order "to come to a 'frank and loyal explanation.'" ¹¹⁴ Count Szapary then told Mr. Sazonof that he had the impression that Austria's attitude was misunderstood in Russia, and thought to be aggressive, whereas in fact Austria's object was "self-preservation and self-defense against a hostile propaganda threatening the integrity of the monarchy, carried on by word, writing and deed." ¹¹⁵

Mr. Sazonof agreed that this purpose was legitimate, but criticized the form of the Austrian note. Count Szapary's report of the conversation then proceeds:

He had studied the note since its presentation, he observed, and would like to peruse it once more with me, if I had time to do so.

I responded that I was at his disposal, but was neither authorized to discuss the wording of the note nor to give an interpretation of it. His remarks, however, would be of greatest interest. The minister then analyzed all the points of our note and this time found that seven of the ten clauses were, on the whole, acceptable. He took exception only to the two clauses dealing with the coöperation of Austria-Hungarian officials in Serbia and to the clause concerning the dismissal of officers and officials to be designated by us. Those clauses he qualified as unacceptable in their present form. ¹¹⁵

The Russian Foreign Minister telegraphed an account of this interview, to which he referred as "a long and friendly conversation," to the which these assurances were conveyed to the Russian Foreign Minister. In his dispatch to Count Berchtold, of July 29, 1914 (Austrian Red Book, No. 47), Count Szapary refers to these assurances as having already been given. And in a dispatch of the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 26, 1914, the Chargé reports the German Ambassador to France as having referred to them on that date. Presumably therefore, they were given at the interview of Count Szapary with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs on the afternoon of July 26, which is discussed in the text. They were repeated in various forms during the course of the negotiations, and great importance was attached to them by Germany and Austria.

¹¹⁴ French Yellow Book, No. 54, M. Paléologue, French Ambassador to St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 26, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 194.

¹¹⁵ Austrian Red Book, No. 31, July 27, 1914, Count Szapary, in St. Petersburg, to Count Berchtold.

Russian Ambassador at Vienna ¹¹⁶ with instructions to acquaint Count Berchtold with the substance thereof, and to request him to instruct the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg to continue the conversations with a view to finding a formula which would "prove acceptable to Servia, while giving satisfaction with respect to the chief of her demands." ¹¹⁷ At the same time, as we have seen, Mr. Sazonof appealed to Berlin for support for his proposal at Vienna. ¹¹⁸

The Russian Ambassador carried out his instructions on July 28th, as appears from a telegram of that date from Count Berchtold to the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg. Count Berchtold rehearses his conversation with the Russian Ambassador, and the latter's proposition, and then proceeds:

I replied that I could not agree to such a proposal. Nobody in Austria-

¹¹⁶ Russian Orange Book, No. 25, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, July 26, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, January, 1915, p. 20. There would seem to be no doubt from the similarity of the two accounts that the conversation referred to in Mr. Sazonof's telegram of July 26th is the same as that reported by the Austrian Ambassador in his telegram of July 27th (Austrian Red Book, No. 31), although it will be noted that Count Szapary's dispatch dated the 27th begins "Have just had a long interview with Mr. Sazonof." The conversation appears to have taken place "on the afternoon of July 26th" (German White Paper, German memorandum, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 375) which would easily account for one of the telegrams reporting it being dated the 27th.

As further fixing the time of the interview as the 26th, see British White Paper, No. 56, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, July 27th, SUPPLEMENT, October, 1914, p. 299 at 300; and British White Papers, Nos. 44, 45, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, July 27th, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, pp. 289-291.

¹¹⁷ Russian Orange Book, No. 25, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Vienna, July 26, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, Jan. 1915, p. 20. It appears from Mr. Sazonof's telegram that he had made this suggestion to Count Szapary, and his instructions to the Russian Ambassador in fact take the form of directing him to bring the substance of his conversation with Count Szapary to Count Berchtold's attention. Textually this portion of his telegram reads:

"With this object in view it seemed to me most desirable that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador should be authorized to enter into a private exchange of views in order to redraft certain articles of the Austrian note of the 10th [23rd] July in consultation with me. This method of procedure would perhaps enable us to find a formula which would prove acceptable to Servia, while giving satisfaction to Austria in respect of the chief of her demands. Please convey the substance of this telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in a judicious and friendly manner." (Russian Orange Book, No. 25, SUPPLEMENT, Jan. 1915, p. 20.)

¹¹⁸ See *supra*, p. 436, and notes 108 and 109.

Hungary would understand or approve such a discussion of a note which we already had found unsatisfactory. Such a discussion appears all the more impossible since public opinion is already deeply and generally excited, as the Ambassador must be well aware. Moreover, we have declared war on Serbia today.¹¹⁹

The Russian Ambassador, on the same date, reported the failure of his mission, in the following language:

Count Berchtold replied that he was well aware of the gravity of the situation and of the advantages of a frank explanation with the St. Petersburg Cabinet. He told me that, on the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian Government, who had only decided, much against their will, on the energetic measures which they had taken against Serbia, could no longer recede, nor enter into any discussion of the terms of the Austro-Hungarian note.¹²⁰

And so the direct conversations between Austria and Russia, from which so much had been hoped, failed of their purpose. True, they were resumed two days later, as a result apparently of German advice at Vienna,¹²¹ and it was then explained on the part of Austria that they had been broken off through a misunderstanding.¹²² But by that time other and graver issues had arisen, and the resumed conversations were cut short by mobilization and war.

The circumstances under which the conversations were resumed will be dealt with in detail in a subsequent article. It is sufficient for present purposes to point out that on July 28th, Austria definitely declined to continue direct conversations with Russia with respect to the terms of the Austrian note to Serbia and the Serbian reply.

¹¹⁹ Austrian Red Book, No. 40, Count Berchtold to Count Szapary in St. Petersburg.

¹²⁰ Russian Orange Book, No. 45, Russian Ambassador to Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 28, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, Jan. 1915, p. 29 at 30. See also British White Paper, No. 74, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, July 28, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 310; No. 78, Sir George Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, July 29, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 313.

¹²¹ German White Paper, German memorandum, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 378.

¹²² Austrian Red Book, No. 47, Count Szapary to Count Berchtold, July 29, 1914; No. 49, Count Berchtold to Count Szapary in St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914; No. 50, Count Berchtold to Count Szapary in St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914. French Yellow Book, No. 104, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Viviani, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 247.

On the same day Austria formally declared war on Servia.¹²³

Assuming in favor of the Allies that one hundred years of history have shown that there is an Eastern question, and that this question is admittedly a matter of common concern for the great Powers of Europe, and concluding from the diplomatic correspondence itself that Austro-Servian relations had been recognized by all parties since 1909 as forming a part of this common concern;

Assuming in favor of Germany and Austria that the circumstances surrounding the assassinations of Serajevo gave Austria a legitimate cause of complaint against Servia, and concluding from the *ex parte* evidence presented on behalf of Austria and included in the diplomatic correspondence that Servia ought to have offered spontaneously to start an investigation of Austria's allegations of complicity on the part of Servian officials in the assassinations;

It is submitted that the correspondence from the Austrian note of July 23rd to the Austrian declaration of war on Servia shows that Austria and Germany assumed at the outset a provocative and inadmissible attitude and consistently declined during this period to modify that attitude; that on the other hand the Powers of the Triple Entente—and particularly Great Britain—during the period in question, consistently sought to preserve the peace of Europe. Up to this point, therefore, it is submitted that the onus of bringing on the war rests unmistakably with Germany and Austria. If a justification of Austria and Germany is to be made out on the official documents, it must rest on the correspondence subsequent to July 28th, which will be considered in a subsequent article.

WILLIAM CULLEN DENNIS.

¹²³ Austrian Red Book, No. 37, Count Berchtold to the Royal Servian Minister for Foreign Affairs at Belgrade; British White Paper, No. 73, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, July 28, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 310.